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Quasi-Checks: An Apology for a Mutation of
Negotiable Instruments
Jonathan Yovel*
ABSTRACT
This essay deals with one of the persistent problems in the law of
negotiable instruments, namely the legal phenomenon of so-called
"quasi-instruments" (it focuses on quasi-checks and deals briefly
with quasi-notes.) First, it supplies a formal definition for quasi-in-
struments. It then proceeds to analyze the real-world interests, con-
cerns and risks associated with quasi-checks, dealing respectively
with those risks that are germane to banks, payors, payees, and sub-
sequent holders. It proceeds on three levels: analytic introduction of
the phenomenon, including the UCC Article 3 "extension rule" that
accords fully negotiable status to some quasi-instruments, but no to
others; normative and relational analysis pre- and post-revision ex-
tension rule; and finally, a certain critique of the prevalent justifica-
tion to the validation of quasi-instruments (mainly, streamlining
banking practices and technology) and forwarding an alternative,
relational justification (based on the reliance interests of payees and
subsequent holders). The alternative justification calls for a more
inclusive approach to quasi-instruments, in one sense favoring the
extension rule of pre-revision UCC Article 3 over that of the post-
revision (however, the post-revision policy is justified inasmuch as
granting holder in due course status quasi-holders is concerned).
The essay also makes the claim-made nowhere previously, as far
as research could establish-that the post-revision extension rule of
UCC Art. 3 contains a serious technical flaw. The fact that practice
and application are by and large indifferent to this flaw is not so
much a failure of scholarship or the judiciary, but instead indicates
that once a satisfactory theoretical solution to the question of quasi-
instruments is generally reached, technical failings in the relevant
statute (here, UCC §3-104(c)) are relatively inconsequential. Other
issues covered are the influence of Check 21 on quasi-instruments,
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the question of depository banks as holders in due course, and other
matters. This essay then combines positive and normative analyses
of negotiable instruments law with jurisprudential generalizations
that follow from these layers of analysis.
I. QUASI-CHECKS IN LAW AND PRACTICE
One of the concerns dealt with in the 1990 revision of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") Article 3 is that of so-called quasi-checks,
a subset of quasi-instruments.1 A quasi-instrument is commercial pa-
per that for some failure of form does not conform to the constitutive
requirements of negotiability as set forth in UCC Article 3.2 It is thus,
ostensibly, not a negotiable instrument, although to unsuspecting par-
ties it may appear to be one.3 Parties may then take such instruments
inadvertently, in misguided reliance on its transferability and the rela-
tive lack of defenses that are typical of negotiable instruments, espe-
cially as entailed by the status of holder in due course.4 Such parties
employ a de facto mistaken allocation of risks regarding the financial
aspect of the transaction, one that may be difficult or impractical to
remedy short of by falling back on the default contractual level;5 such
1. U.C.C. § 3. "Revision" here and throughout this study indicates the 1990 revision of
U.C.C. Article 3; all references are to the revised U.C.C. Article 3 unless otherwise indicated.
"Pre-revision" indicates the U.C.C. prior to the 1990 revision, as is still in force, for example, in
New York.
2. See U.C.C. §§ 3-102 to 3-104.
3. See id.
4. The right of a holder in due course in an instrument overrides property defenses: the law
here must adjudicate a priori between innocent parties in situations where shifting risk to the
least cost avoider-ostensibly, the defendant-may seem artificial and unsupported by real life
situations (the defendant, whether a drawer or previous holder/indorser, may never be in any
actual sense in a position to avoid losing an instrument or having it stolen, than a later and
equally innocent holder is from verifying any lack of prior claims or defenses). See U.C.C. §§ 3-
302 to 306. A holder in due course is a holder of an instrument who took it for value, in good
faith, and without any of a series of notices pertaining to the instrument's integrity or claims
against it. See U.C.C. § 3-302. Such a holder's claim preempts any prior property rights in the
instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-306. Obviously, the question whether any person in possession of a
negotiable instrument is a "holder in due course" requires relatively clear and formal demarca-
tion standards, because the ability to become a holder in due course is a weighty consideration
for anyone who considers taking an instrument as a cash substitute or a credit mechanism. For a
brief discussion of initial payees as holders in due course, see infra notes 94-95 and accompany-
ing text.
5. Examples of this default contractual level include the doctrine of mistake and substantive
breaches of contract that would allow for avoidance of the financial part of the transaction and
require the payor to tender payment in substitution. Common law, including contract law, ap-
plies to instruments whenever it is not trumped by U.C.C. provisions in accordance with U.C.C.
§ 1-103 - considered by Professors White and Summers as "probably the most important single
provision in the Code." JAMES J. WITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
8 (5th ed. 2000); see also Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What it Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285
(1966) (emphasizing the parallel and continuing application of common law in jurisdictions that
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misallocation, in any case, frustrates the purpose of paying with an
instrument that "propertizes" an obligatory relation between parties
by merging artifact with value. 6 Whether such flawed tenders occur
innocuously or fraudulently is of little immediate effect, as the formal-
istic structure of the relevant UCC Article 3 clauses is quite indiffer-
ent to the drawer's intent.7 Even marginal flaws may impair an
instrument's validity as such. Whether the instrument would then re-
tain at least a contractual status is debatable and context-specific, 8 and
even so, it would be subject to a different-and typically, much
wider-array of defenses against enforcement.
The primary function of the law of negotiable instruments is to facil-
itate exchange by enhancing the attractiveness of cash substitutes such
have adopted the U.C.C.); see also Richard Danzig, A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975). For a similar approach see pre-revi-
sion U.C.C. § 3-409(2); the subsection was omitted by the 1990 revision as "superfluous."
U.C.C. § 3-408 Official Comment.
6. This article does not deal with the general question of the desirability of negotiability as a
legal category, addressed critically elsewhere. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability - Who
Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1971); see also Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in
Payment and Credit Systems, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 951 (1997).
7. See Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 441 (1979) (on the formalist structure of Article 3); see also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due
Course: Codification and the Victory of Form over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 363 (2002). The Article 3 revision committee discussed and rejected switch-
ing from a formalist to a functional structure. See ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 26-28 (5th ed. 2000); see also FRED H. MILLER & ALVIN
HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND NOTES 2-7 (2d ed. 1992) (offering a
model for such a functional structure). Gilmore condemns contemporary negotiable instrument
law for what he sees as being woefully behind the times: "[T]ime seems to have been suspended,
nothing has changed, the late twentieth century law of negotiable instruments is still a law for
clipper ships and their exotic cargoes from the Indies." Id. at 448. See also Taylor v. Roeder-
decided under the pre-revision Article 3-in which the majority and minority clearly express
formalist versus relational-functionalist approaches to interpretation, respectively; at bar was the
question of whether a variable rate of interest renders a note nonnegotiable-the majority held
that it did under pre-revision U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) that required a note to contain "a sum cer-
tain." Taylor v. Roeder, 234 Va. 99, 360 S.E.2d 191 (Ct. App.1987). See also Grant Gilmore, On
the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341 (1948).
8. Paper claiming contractual status rather than negotiability must satisfy a different set of
conditions, namely those pertaining to formation, consideration, form, etcetera. See Regent Cor-
poration USA v. Azmat Bangladesh Ltd. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Index No. 120865/94 1994) available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/comdiv[Law%20Report%2OFiles/July%201998/regent7.htm. Ac-
cording to the court, a drawee bank does not become contractually beholden to any depository
bank or payee without undertaking to pay by "accepting" the instrument. Id.
"[Defendant] IFIC has not provided facts which would indicate that the issuing banks had any
contractual relationship with IFIC whereby they would be independently obligated to IFIC on
the drafts... Thus, in the absence of any evidence indicating a separate obligation on the part of
the issuing banks, they are not liable to IFIC on the drafts absent their acceptance of them." Id.
at 14.
In some jurisdictions even the civil procedure governing instrument-based claims is significantly
different-shorter, cheaper, with discretionary allowance for defense-than contractual claims.
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as drafts, checks, promissory notes, and the like.9 This requires that
questions such as whether an instrument is negotiable, or whether by
taking it a person becomes entitled to enforce it relatively free of de-
fenses-e.g., a holder or a holder in due course 10-be resolvable eas-
ily, accurately, with a high degree of certainty, at minimal cost and
with as little as possible administrative hassle. Due to the importance
of checks in commerce, banking, consumer, and household transac-
tions-as well as payments of personal, social, and other non-commer-
cial nature-this study will focus mainly on checks and on their legal
treatment and practical usages (both those practiced by drawers and
by banks). Indeed, other payment systems-in particular electronic
transfers-have taken a chunk out of the transactional volume domi-
nated by checks. In the year 2000 it was still the case that "the paper
check continues to be the most commonly used type of noncash pay-
ment instrument in the U.S. economy,"11 as checks were used almost
twice as much as debit and credit cards combined-over 42.5 billion
check transactions (down, significantly, from almost 49.5 billion in
1995, when checks dominated almost seventy-seven percent of retail
transactions). 12 By 2003, however, electronic payments were made for
slightly over fifty-three percent of the eighty billion noncash transac-
tions in the U.S. economy.' 3 The average annual rate of decline in the
number of checks paid is estimated to have been 3.3 percent between
1995 and 2000 and 4.3 percent between 2000 and 2003 (2003 is the last
year for which the Federal Reserve published statistics), although
checks continued to be the largest noncash payment type by value and
exceeded the combined value of all the other noncash payment
types.' 4
9. Another function, the creation of credit mechanisms, will not be discussed in this study.
10. A "holder in due course" is a holder of an instrument who took it for value, in good faith,
and without any of a series of notices pertaining to the instrument's integrity or claims against it.
U.C.C. § 3-302. Such a holder's claim preempts any prior property rights in the instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-306.
11. Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K. Walton II, The Use of Checks and Other Noncash Payment
Instruments in the United States, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 360, 360 (2002), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2002/0802_2nd.pdf. These numbers have later been adjusted
slightly downwards. The number of checks quoted is "net": it represents the number of checks
used and paid as such, and does not include checks converted to electronic payments at the point
of sale or during the process of collection. Although growing, automated clearinghouse systems
(ACH) are used almost exclusively for payroll and bill processing, as opposed to more typical
commercial and consumer transactions.
12. Id. at fig. 1.
13. Geoffrey R. Gerdes et al., Trends in the Use of Payment Instruments in the United States, 91
FED. RES. BULL. 180, 180 fig. 1 (2005).
14. Id. at 182.
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With all the emphasis on the formalism of the law of negotiable
instruments-i.e., a conceptual framework that purports to govern
practice-recent developments in the law of checks actually establish
a practice-to-law dimension. In other words, practice that becomes en-
trenched-either spontaneously or institutionally 15-may create de
facto patterns that deviate from the letter of the law but suggest them-
selves as modifications to the current regulation rather than appear as
transgressions of it. The standard case of such a "mutation" in the
area of negotiable instruments is that of quasi-checks, a more complex
phenomenon than initially apparent. The following sections present
quasi-checks as a matter of law and of practice, then move from analy-
sis to the normative considerations underlying them and suggests an
alternative justification to the legal validation of quasi-instruments-
emphasizing the reliance interests of payees and subsequent holders,
rather than the streamlining of banking practices that are generally
held to underline quasi-checks. Thus while the opening section will be
familiar to any student of negotiable instruments law, it quickly turns
to system-analysis and to some of the normative principles of com-
mercial law regulation.
How do quasi-checks come to be? UCC §3-104(a) imposes rela-
tively strict necessary conditions, that when met and only when met-
cumulatively-entail negotiability.1 6 These requirements are all "in-
ternal": supposedly, they do not require examining any in personam
relations and are all manifestable from the instrument itself. As com-
plex as they are from some perspectives, checks are not the appropri-
ate legal text for elaborate interpretative exercises. As the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals famously remarked, "[n]egotiable notes are de-
signed to be couriers without excess luggage ... and so negotiability
must be determined from the face of the note without regard to
15. For the processes of entrenchment of practice that subsequently becomes legally-relevant,
see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
16. Thus, for commercial paper to be a negotiable instrument it must be in writing (U.C.C.
§ 3-103(6) for "order" and § 3-103(9) for "promise"), signed (§§ 3-104(a) to 3-106), uncondi-
tional (§§ 3-104(a) to 3-106), and either a promise (§ 3-104(e)) or an order (§ 3-104(e)) to pay a
fixed amount of money (according to § 3-104(a) "with or without interest"). See the official
comments to U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a) to 3-112 for provisions regarding interest. Professors White and
Summers note that "the adjective 'fixed' modifies only 'amount of money'; 'interest' is added in
the prepositional phrase.., and is not modified by 'fixed."' WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5,
at 516. Compare these requirements with the distinctly non-formalistic definition of "contract"
in U.C.C. § 1-201(12). While the function of Article 3 requires the limitation of its application to
relatively few and distinct things in the world (namely, negotiable instruments), the reach of
Article 1 is wider and consequently less definite.
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outside sources."'1 7 Below I argue that the "without regard to outside
sources" dictum turns out to be too stern a requirement, as courts in
fact cannot help but consider reliance relations when dealing with
quasi-instruments.18 "Without excess luggage," after all, centers
around what "excess" would entail in different contexts, and in certain
cases may not prove so prohibitive. For the time being, however, it is
taken as the basic tenet of instrument construction-a sort of parol
evidence rule, by analogy, applicable to instruments rather than to
contracts. UCC §3-104(a)(1) adds another requirement, namely that
the instrument be "payable to bearer or to order at the time it is is-
sued or first comes into [the] possession of a holder."' 19
However, checks-which are a kind of draft, i.e. an "order" rather
than a "promise" to pay2 0- in fact often lack either "order" or
"bearer" language because drawers either omit it or cross it out. A
familiar case is when drawers who use so-called "legended" checks-
those familiar instruments that are issued by banks and commercial
printers with imprinted formulas such as "Pay to the order of"-fre-
quently cross out the pre-printed language or parts of it in an effort to
limit its negotiability. Such a limitation on negotiability would be seen
differently from the point of view of three relevant groups: 1) banks,
2) payors or subsequent indorsers who negotiate the instrument, and
3) payees. For an instant, let us ignore what I offer to term "extension
clauses," namely both the post-revision treatment of quasi-checks in
UCC §3-104(c) and the pre-revision treatment in UCC §3-805, that
extend negotiability-like privileges to some quasi-instruments or to
their holders. We shall examine those shortly, once we have broken
down the typical interests involved in transactions involving quasi-
checks according to the groups of relevant participants.
A. Banks
Non-negotiable, quasi-checks would pose a problem for the banking
system if banks purchased the instruments from their customers and
proceeded to enforce them-as holders-against the drawee, i.e. the
17. Walls v. Morris Chevrolet, Inc., 515 P.2d 1405, 1407 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973). Of course, the
label of an instrument is not necessarily determinative of its nature. "It is appropriate to regard
the substance, not the form, of a transaction as controlling, and we are not bound by the labels
which have been appended to the episode by the parties." Branch Banking & Trust Co. v.
Creasy, 301 N.C. 44, 53, 269 S.E.2d 117, 123 (1980); see also Gillespie v. DeWitt, 53 N.C. App.
252, 258, 280 S.E.2d 736, 741, disc. rev. den., 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 832 (1981).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See U.C.C. § 3-109.
20. See U.C.C. § 3-104(f).
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drawer's bank.2' This would have shifted the enforcement and credit
risks associated with cash-substitutes from the payee to her bank,
making the latter reluctant to perform such a service without accom-
modating guarantees-a cumbersome and expensive transaction cost
for everyday usage. Such risks are avoided when banks or other per-
sons present instruments for payment as agents "on behalf of a person
entitled to enforce the instrument" instead of as holders themselves. 22
This is simply agency: the presenter bank does not take title and as-
sumes no liability or warranties on the instrument, except as an agent
(e.g., for loss).23 According to professor Rosenthal, depository banks
do not, as a rule, become holders in due course in deposited checks, as
they do not take them for value.24 They might, however. The deposi-
tory bank becomes a holder because banks require customers to in-
dorse checks that they deposit.25 Most depositors indorse in blank by
simply signing on the back of the check,26 thus making the instrument
to bearer,27 and by physically handing it over to an officer or em-
ployee of the bank or to a designated automated system, they com-
plete the negotiation.28 If the presenter bank irrevocably credits the
customer's account before the check is honored by the drawee, the
presenter bank in fact becomes a holder in due course (as it took the
instrument for value). 29 This may occur following either the federal
21. But see Rosenthal, supra note 6 (according to which depository banks do not, as a rule,
become holders in due course of deposited checks, as they do not take them for value).
22. U.C.C. § 3-501.
23. See U.C.C. § 3-501 ("Presentment").
24. See Rosenthal, supra note 21.
25. A special provision of Article 4, which regulates bank-customer relations, allows banks to
become holders in items they receive for collection-as depository banks-"whether or not the
customer indorses the item." U.C.C. § 4-205(1).
26. See U.C.C. § 3-204.
27. See U.C.C. § 3-204(a) ("regardless of the intent of the signer, a signature and its accompa-
nying words is an indorsement"). There are exceptions to the rule, notably when the "circum-
stances unambiguously indicate" that the signature was not an indorsement. Is the act of
depositing an instrument such a circumstance? The question is not trivial, as indorsers become
liable on the instrument, to any person entitled to enforce it upon dishonor, as well as to subse-
quent indorsers who paid the instrument upon dishonor. See U.C.C. § 3-415(a). Banking prac-
tices may be putting customers at risk of becoming liable indorsers when all the latter wished to
do is to empower their bank to present. (Avoiding such a liability is possible through an addition
of the words "without recourse." See U.C.C. § 3-415(b).).
28. See U.C.C. § 3-201. For an otherwise restrictive indorsement, see U.C.C. § 3-205.
29. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-303, 4-205. For the definition of "value" in this context see U.C.C.
§ 4-211. Efforts to "repatriate" portions of Regulation CC to the U.C.C. Article 4-not, how-
ever, those concerned with funds availability but only collection provisions-have been stalled
for the time being. See Proposed Amendments to U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, May 2002 Draft,
prepared for the 2002 annual meeting of the American Law Institute, which rescinds intentions
expressed in the Reporter's Memorandum to Drafting Committee of U.C.C. Articles 3-4-4A, § 1
(Mar. 30, 2000) available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blllulc/ucc3-4-4AIucc3m300.htm.
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Expedited Funds Availability Act ("EFAA"),30 or Regulation CC,3t
or simply bank practices that, experience proves, are sometimes more
forthcoming to depositing customers than the statutes actually re-
quire.32 Note, however, that such credit may be provisional as EFAA
does not affect the bank's right to revoke a provisional settlement on
a draft that was later dishonored.33
B. Payors
The power to limit an instrument's negotiability is not trivial for
drawers and other payors who wish to restrict its transferability and
retain some of its in personam characteristics and the defenses that
follow from them-in other words, retaining some of the contractual
attributes of the financial transaction as opposed to the more com-
plete in rem "propertization" entailed by negotiability. There may be
various reasons for this: some wish to be able to invoke future de-
fenses that are untenable against a holder in due course, 34 or attach
the instrument's enforcement to an obligation pertaining to the under-
lying transaction (which can be achieved, e.g., in the form of a condi-
tion stipulated on the instrument and thus revoke its negotiability), 35
or rely on an oral promise to defer presentment of the instrument,
that even if somehow applicable in personam on the relational level
between payor and payee, is certainly not binding in rem. While banks
would ostensibly like any instrument they accept to be considered ne-
gotiable, payors-especially in small business, social and non-com-
30. Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-10 (2007).
31. 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2004).
32. According to a Federal Reserve publication from January 27, 2005, "most banks make
funds available faster than required [by EFAA]." Federal Reserve Board, Check Clearing for the
21st Century Act: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/
truncation/faqs2.htm#ques7 (Feb. 27, 2005). EFAA itself requires the Federal Reserve Board to
reduce maximum hold times in step with reductions in actual or "achievable" check-processing
times. 12 U.S.C. § 4002(d)(1). While the use of electronic transmissions instead of paper trans-
fers between an intermediary bank and the drawee, encouraged by Check 21 (see infra, section
II.A., notes 54-58 and accompanying text) should further this trend, consumer groups have
alerted the Federal Reserve that this has yet to occur. A joint letter to the Fed sent on behalf of
several such groups (including the NCRC, CFA, US PIRG, Consumers Union and Consumer
Action) contends that "industry statistics show that nearly half of all checks are clearing using
images, which speeds up check clearing, but consumers are still waiting for an improvement in
check hold times." Letter from Consumers Union et al., to Chairman Bernanke and the Mem-
bers of the Board of Governors (Oct. 31, 2006) (on file with author) available at http://www.
consumersunion.org/pdf/checkholdFRB.pdf. See also Essex Constr. Corp. v. Indus. Bank of
Wash., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 416, (Md. 1995).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 4006(c)(2); U.C.C. § 4-201.
34. Holder in due course is a subset of the set of holders, which in turn is a subset of the more
general set of persons entitled to enforce the instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-309.
35. See U.C.C. §9 3-104(a) to 3-106; see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 513.
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mercial contexts-maintain an important interest in the ability to
create quasi-instruments.
C. A Dissonance of Law and Practice
In practice, even under the pre-revision Article 3, banks paid little
attention to such omissions or deletions of "order" language from the
face of the check. 36 What banks care about are indorsements. As a
matter of practice, anything that appeared like a standardized check
and was properly indorsed counted as a check for purposes of present-
ment, even if it bore no "order" language and was, strictly speaking,
not a negotiable instrument.37 This reality is largely due to the auto-
mated technology that banks employ when they "deal with the billions
of checks issued every year. '38 Checks are processed primarily by op-
tic sensors that read the machine-readable data encoded on the bot-
tom of the check. But even if banks could check the negotiability of
checks they process-and as argued below, they can, should, and in
fact do-they are by and large uninterested in doing so. A dissonance
occurred between the law and the practice of quasi-checks. To deal
with it, the revisers of the UCC Article 3 added an "extension clause,"
UCC §3-104(c), 39 according to which an order that otherwise is a
check-by fulfilling the conditions set in §3-104 subsections (a) (re-
36. At least, such is the premise on which the revision of Article 3 seems to proceed. See
Reporter's Memorandum to Drafting Committee of U.C.C. Articles 3-4-4A, (Mar. 30, 2000)
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc3-4-4A/ucc3m300.htm.
"Legended Checks (§ 3-104(c))
Section 3-104(c) provides that a check can be an instrument even if it does not include
order language. As the comment explains, that ordinarily occurs because the maker
crosses out the order language on the preprinted check form. § 3-104 cmt. 2. The ratio-
nale for that rule is that banks using current check-processing practices cannot reasona-
bly be expected to notice that type of writing on a check. It happens, however, that
customers often write other things on checks ("Void after 90 days" "Not good for over
$1,000"). The rationale for § 3-104(c) would apply to those legends as well, but they
plainly are not protected by that provision. The questions for the Committee are (a)
whether to extend the policy reflected in § 3-104(c) more broadly; and (b) how the
extension might be limited to accommodate business practices dependent on such leg-
ends." Id. at § VIII(B).
37. This does not mean that deleting these words from the face of checks has no practical
function: it may render the instrument relatively unattractive for future transferees, who might
be reluctant to take such instruments in payment. Likewise, their value in the secondary market
for negotiable instruments-the market that deals in dishonored and otherwise enforcement-
challenged drafts and notes-may be considerably lower than otherwise.
38. ROBERT L. JORDAN, ET AL., NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 27 (5th
ed. 2000).
39. According to 3-104(c):
"An order that meets all the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1), and otherwise
falls within the definition of "check" in subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check."
U.C.C. § 3-104(c).
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garding negotiability in general) and (f) (defining checks)-but for
failing to be "payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or
first comes into possession of a holder,' '40 is a negotiable instrument
and a check. Formal law bowed to practice. One may produce an in-
strument that does not contain the negotiability language, or delete it
from a standard-issue check, and it would still be a check and negotia-
ble at that. 41
D. Pre-Revision Law: A Different Strategy
It is instructive to observe the differences in the ways that pre- and
post-revision Article 3 differ on their treatment of quasi-checks. Pre-
revision 3-805 treats any "non-negotiable instruments"-not just
checks-as if they were negotiable for most purposes, except that
there can be no holder in due course in them. 42 The explanation given
for this limitation may seem a bit mysterious. The Official Comment
to §3-805 remarks, as if it were evident, that this was an unavoidable
outcome of the lack of negotiability language. But the whole way §3-
805 proceeds is by analogy-extending the scope of provisions that
apply to negotiable instruments to non-negotiable ones, regardless of
this lack. 43 It treats some things (non-negotiable, quasi-instruments)
as if they were like other things (negotiable instruments), not as if the
former were the latter. And so the denial of holder in due course from
quasi-instruments should have been based on an analogical argument
as well, or more precisely, a reason to limit the application of analogy
40. U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(1).
41. This, at least, is the prevailing view. In another, forthcoming study of U.C.C. §3-104(c) I
point out that the question of quasi-checks' negotiability is not, technically, solved so easily. The
reason is that only something that is either a "promise" or an "order" is a candidate to be a
negotiable instrument in the first place. See U.C.C. §3-104(a). The quasi-check without the "pay"
language is not an instruction according to §3-103(a)(6) and therefore does not qualify as "An
order that meets all the requirements of subsection (a), except paragraph (1)" which is the con-
dition under which §3-104(c) kicks in. However, the present study treats the extension clause §3-
104(c) as providing an adequate remedy to the formal failures of quasi-checks. This issue is
briefly elaborated in Section III, below.
42. Pre-revision U.C.C. § 3-805 provides that:
This article applies to any instrument whose terms do not preclude transfer and which is other-
wise negotiable... but which is not payable to order or to bearer, except that there can be no
holder in due course if such an instrument. U.C.C. § 3-805 (1962).
The Official Comment declares that this section covers "non-negotiable instruments," but that is
a mistake: it covers quasi instruments ("otherwise negotiable"); non-negotiable instruments are
in fact excluded from it. Id.
43. Of course, instruments may still be designated as non-negotiable. See Regent Corporation
USA v. Azmat Bangladesh Ltd. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Index No. 120865/94 1994) available at http:l/
www.courts.state.ny.us/comdiv/Law%20Report%2OFiles/July %201998/regent7.htm, (finding
that the drafts in question were "not-negotiable instruments... since they were not payable "on
demand or at a definite time" according to pre-revision Article 3).
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at the holder in due course point. Moreover, consistency with this ap-
proach would require not only that holder in due course status be de-
nied in non-negotiable instruments, but for the most part holder status
as well (specified payees remain the only persons who may be "hold-
ers" of non-order, non-bearer paper, as it does not have to be negoti-
ated to them). 44
Post-revision Article 3 takes a different route both conceptually and
on the justificatory level, with significant practical differences. Instead
of widening the scope of some provisions pertaining to negotiable in-
struments to non-negotiable ones, it simply waives some conditions of
negotiability for checks, in the sense that checks-but not other in-
struments-that lack order or bearer language become negotiable in-
struments for any and every purpose, including holder in due course
status.45 Note, however, that the two sections-perhaps slightly modi-
fied-could have continued happily together. Courts could then treat
quasi-instruments as negotiable ones in general, 46 except for the status
of holder in due course (but applying such doctrines as warranties
etc.),47 which exception would not hold in the case of quasi-checks.
Why this should be the case with checks in particular now becomes
the focus of discussion.
II. QUASI-CHECKS IN REVISED ARTICLE 3: AN EXTENSION
CLAUSE THAT DOES NOT EXTEND ENOUGH?
As briefly remarked above, 48 the UCC Revised Article 3 still con-
tains a technical glitch-a bug, one might say-according to which, on
a strict reading of the extension clause, many quasi-checks would still
be excluded from the scope of Article 3, with no pre-revision §3-805
recourse. The argument is that post-revision Article 3 fails to distin-
guish between the two kinds of quasi-checks: those lacking the order
or bearer "language of negotiability," and those lacking the "pay" im-
perative altogether. While UCC §3-104(c) solves the first case, it is
silent on the second, although in most imaginable instances, quasi-
checks would in fact fall under both categories. The "Pay" language is
44. See U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
45. U.C.C. § 3-104(c).
46. Except that care must be taken not to overextend "§3-805" to written obligations to pay in
general, i.e. contracts.
47. E.g., the liability of indorsers or other signatories to a non-negotiable note can be seen as
germane to any quasi-instrument. Of course, even an "extended §3-805" would still apply only to
instruments; it should not be applicable to just any written undertaking to pay, thus indirectly
becoming a i.e. contracts.
48. See Reporter's Memorandum to Drafting Committee of U.C.C. Articles 3-4-4A, supra
note 36.
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the imperative that constitutes the order to begin with, and its lack
ostensibly revokes not merely the paper's status as bearer or order
paper, but its very status as an "instruction to pay" following §3-
103(a)(6). If it is not an instruction, such quasi-instrument cannot be
an order, 49 let alone a draft50 or a check. 51 §3-104(c) compensates for
a quasi-check's failure to comply with requirements set in §3-
104(a)(1)-it takes care of the omission of the order or bearer lan-
guage-but not with the very essence that defines a check, namely
that it is an order to "pay." That requirement is set in the parent
clause §3-104(a), not in subsection (1), and thus cannot be covered by
§3-104(c) whose scope of application is limited to §3-104(a)(1). Most
drawers crossing out the negotiability language from legended checks
would tend to cross out both the "pay" imperative and the "words of
negotiability"; in real world terms, the distinction between those who
do and those who do not is arbitrary and senseless; and yet the distinc-
tion is operative under UCC Article 3. Only no one seems to notice or
care.
The fact that this does not seem to trouble anyone-that the statu-
tory glitch has gone unnoticed by academia and courts alike-can be
interpreted in different ways. One is to consider it a failure of scholar-
ship or of the judiciary since 1990 and the subsequent adoption of
UCC Revised Article 3 in most US jurisdictions. Alternately, how-
ever, this may indicate that once a theoretical and practical solution
within the general question of function v. form is commonly
reached-here, the appearance that the extension clause UCC §3-
104(c) covers also those quasi-instruments that it technically does
not-mere technical failings in the relevant statute are relatively un-
important. A drawer or other party attempting to defend against en-
forcement of a quasi-check on grounds that it lacks the "pay"
imperative and thus is not covered by the extension clauses (either
under the revised or pre-revision versions of Article 3) would be tech-
nically right, and yet no court would be justified in accepting the de-
fense. The practice of quasi-checks has by now created, de facto, such
expectations of reliance (again, I am concerned more with those of
holders than of banks) that, albeit the Oklahoma Court of Appeals'
famous dictum in Walls,52 concerns of negotiability cannot be rele-
gated solely to the face of the instrument; nothing in human affairs
nor in law is quite "without luggage." In deference to the principle
49. See U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(6).
50. See U.C.C. § 3-104(e).
51. See U.C.C. § 3-104(f)
52. See Gerdes et al., supra note 13.
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expressed by the court in Walls, such principles-at least in the area of
negotiable instruments, for the reasons discussed above-are best
served when spelled out in the form of a rule such as UCC §3-104(c).
I expect the section to be amended some day-perhaps in the more
inclusive direction of pre-revision §3-805, while keeping the allowance
for holder in due course status in quasi-checks-but not an awful lot
hinges on whether it would or would not be, once courts universally
figure the real-world interests involved in instrument-based transac-
tions and make the correct policy judgments concerning the default
allocation of risks which the extension clauses entail. For extension
clauses are an expression of a jurisprudential principal rather than
merely a legal rule covering quasi-instruments. This is the principle
according to which real-world reliance and relations between parties
are in fact germane to the construction of negotiable instruments,
even when this particular legal field is known-whether hailed or
abused-by its perceived "formalism."
There is one jurisprudential objection that needs be addressed at
this point, itself of a formalistic nature. Namely, the devil's advocate's
position would be to claim that there is no lacuna in cases of quasi-
checks that lack the "pay" language ("class B" as it were), but instead
a positive distinction between two sets of instruments. If no lacuna
exists, no analogy may be applied; indeed both continental and com-
mon law jurisprudences are generally reluctant to extend the scope of
legislation by analogy. 53 However, the above analysis proves that
there is no counter argument here at all. The extension of negotiabil-
ity to "class B" quasi-checks proceeds directly from the clause and
does not involve analogy to "class A" quasi-checks (that only lack the
language of negotiability). Indeed the distinction between the two
classes, as argued before, while formally tenable, is functionally sense-
less. More precisely: as a principle of construction, it does not make
sense to apply formalism itself this way. The extension clause is func-
tional in nature, requiring a garb of formalistic language in order to
suit the general environment and structure of Article 3. But when ap-
53. For this entrenched continental position see Giuseppe Zaccaria, Analogy as Legal Reason-
ing: The Hermeneutic Foundation of the Analogical Procedure, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND
ANALOGY: FRAGMENTS OF LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS, AND LINGUISTICS (Patrick
Nerhot ed., Kluwer Law and Philosophy Library 1991). An important work that challenges the
traditional distinction between analogy (the domain of Rechtsfindung) and functional construc-
tion is Arthur Kaufmann, Analogy and 'The Nature of Things,' A Contribution to the theory of
Types, 8 J. INDIAN L. INST. 358 (1966). For the common-law position see Cass R. Sunstein, Ana-
logical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (footnotes 1-3 offer comprehensive bibliographical
notes on discussions of analogical reasoning); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE 86 (1990), and, of course, the first chapter of the classic treatise by EDWARD LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
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plied and constructed, its initial functional rationale calls for a wider
application than the mere formal categories suggest. Thus the ques-
tion of analogy need not be addressed here at all.
III. WHY SHOULD QUASI-CHECKS BE TREATED AS FULLY
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, ANYWAY?
A. Banks, Again
Interestingly, both pre- and post-revision arrangements give similar
rationales for quasi-checks provisions. It appears to be generally reit-
erated: that in practice, banks process checks automatically, mostly on
the basis of machine-readable data printed on the face of checks, and
effectively have no opportunity to verify the presence of the negotia-
bility language required by §3-104(a)(1). Since October 28, 2004, the
Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (a.k.a. "Check 21")54 encour-
ages banks to transmit checks electronically: banks may capture an
image of the check-front and back-along with the associated pay-
ment information, then transmit this information electronically for
collection in lieu of the paper check. 55 This does not substantively al-
ter other Article 3 or 4 obligations or liabilities56 towards customers,57
nor contractual ones.5 8
Does this mean that banks no longer have ample opportunity to
review purported checks for problems of negotiability-signifiers? This
does not seem true. Checks that tend to be irregular in this respect are
54. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018.
55. The volume of image-based clearings, including images and substitute checks, grew from
20.3 million per month in July 2005 to 283.3 million items per month in August 2006, according
to statistics posted by the Electronic Check Clearing House Organization (ECCHO). ECCHO
projects an annualized 2006 volume of 3.4 billion items clearing using images. According to
ECCHO calculations, this amounts for approximately 9.4% of total checks cleared. Figures are
taken from www.ECCHO.org and from a supplement letter sent by ECCHO to Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke (Dec. 18, 2006).
56. One liability is added, namely that the bank using a "substitute check"-in effect, a new
kind of negotiable instrument, equivalent to the paper check for which it is standing-warrants
that (1) the substitute check contains an accurate image of the front and back of the original
check and a legend stating that it is the legal equivalent of the original check, and (2) no deposi-
tary bank, drawee, drawer, or indorser will be asked to pay a check that it already has paid.
57. U.C.C. §§ 3-501(b)(2), 4-110 authorize banks and other parties to agree to alternative
means of presentment, such as electronic presentment. This, however, requires specific contrac-
tual agreements with all parties involved. By providing that a properly prepared "substitute
check" is the legal equivalent of the original check for all purposes, Check 21 in essence changes
the default rule; as federal law it supersedes contradictory state laws, including both the U.C.C.
and specific legislation that requires banks to return to customers their original checks.
58. If a receiving bank-or its customer , i.e. the drawee-requires a paper check the bank
may use the electronic image and associated payment information to create a paper substitute
check to present or otherwise use instead of the original check.
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mostly personal or small business-issued checks. Such checks always
have some hand written, or even typed in, non-machine-readable lan-
guage on them that banks must confirm manually: for one, the sum to
be paid and the correspondence of the words to the figures,59 indorse-
ment by signature (although not-at this point-its authentication or
verification, which may be performed by optic sensors comparing the
signature to the sample held by the bank), the issue date,60 any added
language that might impair negotiability, etc. Indorsements are of
course pivotal. Other language may compromise an ostensibly-negoti-
able instrument's status in ways that are not covered by §3-104(c),
such as conditions or further undertakings that violate §3-104(a) or
§3-104(a)(3), respectively, etcetera.
As banks become holders in instruments that are negotiated to
them for the purpose of subsequent presentment they risk taking and
passing on a non-negotiable instrument. Check 21 changes none of
this, it only allows banks to use digital images of checks rather than
the paper artifact. A few scenarios are possible: 1) Banks risk credit-
ing the customer's account prior to actual collection of an unenforce-
able instrument, either by practice or under an Expedited Funds
statute;61 2) banks may become liable on the instrument to subsequent
holders in case they negotiate it further through indorsement,62 or
under transfer or presentment warranties, 63 subject to the statutory
exception that allows an instrument to be denied and returned by the
drawee without dishonoring it;64 3) with drawee banks the case is not
just their own risk, which overall convenience in handling checks may
justify, but also their liability to a customer whose account was
charged for an instrument that should not have been enforced, such as
a non-negotiable order to pay a designated person, that is presented
by someone other than the designated payee. The opportunity to in-
spect those checks in fact exists, when a payee or other person either
presents a check or deposits it in her account through negotiation. It
then passes at least one manual inspection (machine-readable data is
then encoded on it if needed, and the remainder of the clearing pro-
59. When discrepancy occurs, words prevail over numbers. U.C.C. § 3-114.
60. Banks may, but are not obligated to pay checks after six months. See U.C.C. § 4-404.
61. See Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4001-10.; Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. Part
229. For a relatively recent case regarding the relations between EFAA and U.C.C. art. 4, see
Essex Constr. Corp. v. Indus. Bank of Wash., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 416 (D. Md. 1995).
62. See U.C.C. § 3-415.
63. See U.C.C. §§ 3-416 and 3-417 (respectively).
64. See U.C.C. § 3-501(b)(3) (whereby drawee may refuse payment upon presentment with-
out dishonoring the instrument for lack of proper indorsement, or failure of the presentment to
comply with some other requirement. In such cases liabilities following from §3-415 will not
occur).
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cess may be automated). As noted above, the inspection may include
far more than verification of indorsement. Even the Check 21 process
that allows banks to send electronic images for purposes of present-
ment, rather than ship the paper itself, requires a precise image of
both sides of the instrument that would includes all the data available
on the check itself. If so-and this certainly seems to be the case-
there actually is an established opportunity for banks to inspect nego-
tiability language on all non-commercial and many commercial
checks; on any check, in fact, that is not generated by an automated
system that produced wholly machine-readable instruments (such as
payroll checks). 65 If banks do not wish to empower a teller or an ATM
collector to perform this task they can have irregular checks put aside
for future examination by a designated clerk; or they may choose to
assume all the risks enumerated above. Even then, their customers'
interests are still at risk (in scenario (3), above).
The case is a bit more complicated with checks that are sent to a
collection lockbox. The sum and other details are then mechanically
or digitally encoded on them in preparation for presentment, a "pre-
presentment" as it were. Presentment may then be completed on a
purely machine-readable basis, in synergy with Check 21.66 Even then,
an agent of the encoding entity, although not necessarily a bank em-
ployee, would manually handle the check (or its precise image) at
some point.67 All this may seem somewhat low-tech in a world where
digital and online payment systems multiply geometrically. 68 So it is.
With changing technology, this analysis may at some point become
obsolete-as may checks or negotiable instruments altogether, or for
that matter printed law reviews, books, and other textual artifacts. For
the time being, however, they are still here to serve their numerous
functions.
The fact that banks have opportunities to inspect checks-be it in
paper or electronic form-is, of course, no argument against the obvi-
ous benefits of streamlining a costly and in some respects inefficient
check collection system (in 2002, prior to the enactment of Check 21,
65. Note the semantic and etymological relation between the homonyms "check" (a noun)
and the verb "to check:" a "check" being, as it were, a thing that requires being "checked," i.e.
inspected.
66. Check 21 adds some technical requirements to the data encoded in the framework of a
substitute check. For details see FDIC memo to all FDIC-supervised banks (May 21, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2004/fil5404.html.
67. The encoding entity may or may not be liable on encoding warranties consistent with the
transfer warranties of Article 3. See France v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 913 S.W.2d 770 (Ark.
1996).
68. For details, see infra notes 11, 13.
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the Federal Reserve system has spent-on processing 16.6 billion
checks-a total of $744.3 million). 69 Nevertheless, some such costs
must be incurred by the very nature of the instrument system. Some-
times, institutional and relational considerations pull in different di-
rections. This is not the case with quasi instruments, and the following
section offers a relational justification for the validation of quasi-in-
struments that stands independently of the institutional "argument
from efficiency. '70
B. Protecting Payees and Subsequent Holders
There is a more compelling reason for disempowering drawers from
making non-negotiable checks than that based solely on banks' prac-
tice and convenience. It has to do with balancing the limitation on
drawers' freedom of action with the enforcement risks born by payees
and subsequent holders-the general class of persons who might by
paid by the instrument via presentment, whether direct payees or
holders down the line of negotiation. As noted above, allowing draw-
ers to limit negotiability, while possibly serving useful functions, is
also a haven for crooks. Holders of quasi-checks that are non-negotia-
ble for lack of order or bearer language only, would find themselves in
a position where enforcing the instrument is onerous or even impossi-
ble.71 Not entitled to holder in due course status, they would be sub-
ject to defenses on the instrument and possibly unable to negotiate it
to subsequent holders, including not to a depository bank. They would
forfeit the relative ease and confidence that negotiable instruments
convey on their holders. More often than not they would not be aware
of the enforcement obstacles that the instrument's non-negotiability
produces at the time they take it.
If the law should treat non-negotiable quasi-checks as negotiable
ones-as §3-104(c) does but the pre-revision §3-805 doesn't-the
69. For which it charged $759 million (the Monetary Control Act of 1980 requires the Federal
Reserve to charge fees for providing payments services-including check processing-to cover
(i) operational expenses, and (ii) imputed taxes and profits that would be earned by private firms
providing similar services.) See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., ANN. REP. 128,
139 (2002).
70. Measuring efficiency in financial services involves a set of fascinating theoretical, empiri-
cal, and policy issues that, however, are not germane to the argument presented here. See R.
Alton Gilbert, David C. Wheelock, & Paul W. Wilson, New Evidence on the Fed's Productivity in
Providing Payments Services, 28 J. BANKING AND FIN. 2175 (2004); David C. Wheelock & Paul
W. Wilson, Trends in the Efficiency of Federal Reserve Check Processing Operations, 86(5) FED.
RES. BANK ST. Louis REV. 7 (2004); Patrick H. McAllister & Douglas A. McManus, Resolving
the Scale Efficiency Puzzle in Banking, 17 J. BANKING AND FIN. 389 (1993).
71. The "impossible" scenario is when a quasi-check is transferred through quasi-negotiation,
leaving the quasi-holder with no Article 3 recourse to enforce the instrument.
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compelling reason is protecting payees and subsequent holders at the
expense of the drawers' power to create quasi-instruments at will.72
Some commentators treat this limitation in a cavalier manner or ig-
nore it altogether, but it doesn't seem insignificant. However, a
drawer may still limit negotiability through a positive signifier, e.g. by
imprinting "non-negotiable" or similar language to that effect on the
face of the instrument (this will still require banks to inspect the in-
strument). I do not see how limiting a drawer's freedom to create in-
struments-which is akin to her freedom of contract-may be
justified merely by making banks' life easier, even if unifying banks'
handling of all types of instruments is otherwise advisable and cost-
reducing. 73 The best justification for extension clauses such as §3-
104(c) or pre-revision §3-805 lays elsewhere. It follows from assessing
the respective interests of drawers on the one hand, and the reliance
interests of payees and subsequent holders on the other. Innocent
payees, especially those down the line of negotiation, are at a much
greater risk from non-negotiable instruments than innocent drawers
are from not being able to limit the negotiability of their checks. The
official comment hints at this general direction, observing that
Absence of the quoted words [bearer or order language] can easily
be overlooked and should not affect the rights of holders who may
pay money or give credit for a check without being aware that it is
not in the conventional form.74
As noted above, drawers have other ways of producing non-negotia-
ble instruments available to them, all of which involve the creation of
paper-whether order or promise-that looks sufficiently not like a
standard check, for it not to be mistakenly taken for one. The availa-
bility of such means is the true reason for allowing the quasi-checks
"mutation" as a balance between the typical interests of drawers on
the one hand and payees and holders on the other. The fact that this
helps banks streamline their processes is an added benefit rather than
the main justification.
This analysis also shows why the regulation by the post-revision §3-
104(c) is-in the case of checks-preferable to the pre-revision §3-
72. In this section I use "holder" in a broad sense, that includes non-holders who are entitled
to enforce the instrument. See U.C.C. § 3-301.
73. This interest is recognized in the Federal Reserve's Regulation CC, whose definition of a
check includes nonnegotiable items, drafts not drawn on a bank (as long as they are payable at
or through a bank), postal money orders, traveler's checks, and such instruments that identify
the payor bank only by routing number (see Reg. CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(k)). See Fed. Res. Bank
of Boston Memorandum Re Comments on U.C.C. Article 3, 4 and 4A Revision Draft of 7/12/00,
(Aug. 9, 2000) (on file with author).
74. U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2.
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805. Only according to the revised provision does the payee-and not
less to the point, subsequent holders-receive the adequate protection
of holder in due course status.75 On the other hand, it still allows the
drawer to produce a non-negotiable order or other instrument if the
context of any transaction requires it.76 On the other hand, the post-
revision extension clause applies to checks only, and this will be criti-
cized in the conclusion, below, following a look at the diverse ways in
which quasi-instruments fared in courts in the absence of a unified
applicable jurisprudence.
C. Payees and Holders, Again
As unusual as UCC §3-104(c) seems-within the otherwise formal-
istic framework of Article 3-it in fact expresses insights that gov-
erned some court decisions even prior to the 1990 Revision. In those
instances, courts-correctly, I claim-set aside the strict "grammar"
of negotiability in favor of a functional and practice-based analysis,
considering the reliance of payees and holders in accepting the quasi-
instrument in payment. Significantly, this would not violate the preva-
lent "face of the instrument" interpretative rule-of-thumb, because
even when strict grammatical rules in the formation of instruments are
not followed, the face of the instrument may still provide enough sig-
nifiers and indications of negotiability. Comparing two cases, an ear-
lier one (1975) from Illinois, a later one (1998) from Tennessee, is
instructive in more than one way. In both cases, quasi-notes failed to
designate either a payee or, by use of such words as "bearer" or
"cash," constitute bearer paper.77 As a negotiable instrument must be
one or the other, this would generally seem a good defense against
enforcement. At best, such quasi-notes would then be reduced to con-
tractual status-pending comity or proper assignment-and conse-
quently subject to the contractual defenses that the merger doctrine
overcomes. 78 In both cases the language immediately following the
75. On the status of initial payees as holders in due course see discussion below.
76. See Skiles v. Sec. State Bank, 494 N.W.2d 355 (Neb. App. 1992) (Certificates of Deposit -
that ostensibly are a kind of promissory notes - were ruled non-negotiable instruments for a
number of reasons, such as not being payable to order or to bearer).
77. Both cases fell under pre-revision U.C.C. § 3-111, according to which an instrument is
bearer paper if it is payable to:
(a) bearer or the order of bearer; or
(b) a specified person or bearer; or
(c) "cash" or the order of "cash," or any other indication which does not purport to
designate a specific payee.
78. i.e., merging instrument with value, rather than having the instrument merely represent
external value. For merger doctrine see Gilmore, supra note 7; SNS Fin., LLC v. ABCO Homes,
Inc., 167 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1999); Lambert v. Barker, 348 S.E.2d 214(Va. 1986). In fact, as long as
20071
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promise/order language indicated, instead of a payee or some designa-
tion of bearer, the sum of money held by the instrument (for instance,
"Pay to the order of three hundred dollars.") 7 9 In such cases defend-
ants' claim is that the promise or order paper failed to satisfy the con-
stitutive conditions of bearer paper by failing to feature-after the
promise or order language-any proper indication of a payee, accord-
ing to the requirements of pre-revision UCC §3-111 that governed the
cases.
80
In the Illinois case of Broadway Mgmt. Corp. v. Briggs,81 the pur-
ported instrument at issue-which the court interpreted as a note (it
had both "promise" and "order" language, the former preceding the
latter) 82-read in pertinent part as follows:
"Ninety Days after date, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the
order of Three Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Eight and 45/100 - -
----- Dollars." 83
The underlined words and symbols were typed in; the remainder was
pre-printed. On pre-revision UCC §3-111, was this bearer paper? It
certainly does not fall under the provisional alternatives of §3-111(a)
("bearer or the order of bearer") nor §3-111(b) ("a specified person
or bearer"). Does §3-111(c) apply? Or does the purported instrument
contain "any other indication which does not purport to designate a
specific payee"? 84 The court held that this alternate condition of §3-
111(c) was not satisfied: 85
there are any defenses against enforcement of the instrument, on the one hand, and some pro-
tections against loss or destruction of the instrument on the other, the merger doctrine is always
qualified. The easiest way to measure this qualification is the absolute merger of value and arti-
fact that cash represents (where the only defense is forgery, a kind of fraud really).
79. I use the term "sum of money held" by an instrument in preference to "represent" and the
like, as better fitting the so-called merger doctrine. A valid instrument does not merely represent
a sum of money: the value is invested in the instrument, which is that sum.
80. See supra, note 77. There is no real significance to the fact that these are pre-revision
cases: the concept of quasi-instrument remains the same, and the revision § 3-104(c) refers only
to checks (which are drafts), while these cases concerned notes. Pre-revision § 3-104(1) stated
that "Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must... (d) be payable to
order or to bearer." Thus the double condition-that the instrument be payable, and that it must
be either to bearer or to order, is similar in pre-and post-revision versions.
81. Broadway Mgmt. Corp. v. Briggs, 332 N.E.2d 131 (I11. App. 1975).
82. Not an unusual case. When an instrument can be equally interpreted as a draft as well as a
note, it is the prerogative of the person entitled to enforce it to chose either (U.C.C. § 3-104(e)).
In Broadway Mgmt. the promise language precedes the order language, thus extending the
promise function over the order function; everything that follows the promise language is subject
and parenthesized by it.
83. Broadway Mgmt. Corp., 332 N.E.2d at 132.
84. U.C.C. § 3-111(c) (pre-revision).
85. Influenced, perhaps, by the Official Comment's emphasis on a different situation, namely
that of leaving a blank after the order language: "Paragraph (c) is reworded to remove any
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The instrument here is not bearer paper. We cannot say that it
"does not purport to designate a specific payee." Rather, we believe
the wording of the instrument is clear in its implication that the
payee's name is to be inserted between the promise and the
amount.. 86
Such is also the position of Anderson's treatise on the UCC: "When a
note is improperly written so that the blank for the name of the payee
shows the amount to be paid, the paper is not bearer paper." 87 The
court goes out on a limb to uphold the "face of the instrument" doc-
trine with no consideration for the context of its creation and negotia-
tion. It does not concern itself with the common-law method of
analogical reasoning,88 asking whether the paper in question is more
like a blank one, which-to follow the official comment (always a
tricky business)-is patently not bearer paper and not a negotiable
instrument; 9 or is it more like a paper stating "Pay to cash," which is
both? 90
In a similar but later case, a Tennessee court analyzed a purported
instrument in its functional contexts. In the case of Waldron v. Delfs,91
the paper read as follows:
[P]romise to pay to the order of one hundred and fifty three thou-
sand and four hundred and fourty dollars Dollars (sic).
The underlined text was inserted, handwritten, between the pre-
printed legends. Among other defenses on the instrument, the main
question was the same as in Broadway Mgmt.: on §3-111, was this
bearer paper?92 The court ruled that it was:
possible implication that "Pay to the order of " makes an instrument payable to bearer."
Official Comment to U.C.C. § 3-111 (pre-1990 revision).
86. Broadway Mgmt. Corp., 332 N.E.2d at 133.
87. RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 275-76 (3d ed. 1994).
88. See supra note 5. Jurisprudential analyses have engaged analogical reasoning-critically or
approvingly-since Aristotle. See Cass R. Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning 106 HARV. L. REV.
741 (1992) (footnotes 1-3 offer comprehensive bibliographical notes on discussions of analogical
reasoning). Richard Posner disapprovingly comments that "The heart of legal reasoning as con-
ceived by most modern lawyers is reasoning by analogy," RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 86 (1990).
89. See supra note 85.
90. See U.C.C. § 3-111(c) (pre-revision).
91. C.A. No. 01A01-9712-CH-00740 (Tenn. App. 1998) (on file with author).
92. As the facts in Waldron occurred prior to Tennessee's enactment of U.C.C. revised Article
3 in 1995, the case was decided under pre-revision Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-3-104, 47-3-
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[I]t would appear to be a "perversion of logic" if an instrument pay-
able to "cash" qualifies as bearer paper, whereas an instrument pay-
able to a specific amount of cash fails to qualify as bearer paper. 93
In both Broadway Mgmt. and Waldron, enforcement was clearly based
on legitimate reliance. In Waldron, the court deemed it absurd to rule
on a strict, "face-value" rule. Instead, it first determined whether in
the context of relations among the parties there were good grounds
for reliance-namely, for the payee taking the instrument as such.
Once the court determined that there were, technical flaws on the face
of the document could not, in themselves, negate negotiability on a
doctrine whose purpose is to protect legitimate reliance. Although not
regarding a check and thus not subject to the post-revision extension
clause directly, the kind of policy considerations pertaining to quasi-
checks may have influenced the court's liberal construction in
Waldron.
There is a related question that while not crucial to this analysis
must be mentioned, namely whether the status of holder in due course
may be accordable to the initial payee or only to subsequent holders.
It is not crucial to the analysis because the reliance of subsequent
holders on the negotiability of the instrument is not altogether differ-
ent from that of initial payees (although not identical, of course, as
designated payees may present non-negotiable instruments); and be-
cause the argument would hold even if the interests and risks born by
the initial payees would not support it. Nevertheless, settling this issue
would help integrating quasi-checks in the general template of negoti-
able instruments. The question itself is in some dispute. There is some
merit to the claim that a holder in due course could only be a person
to whom the instrument was negotiated, which would preclude, in the
case of checks at least, the initial payee to whom the instrument was
tendered in payment rather than negotiated. In other words, the argu-
ment is that the unusual status of holder in due course is required by
the very transferability of the cash substitute rather than in the con-
text of its initial tender as a payment device (thus official comment 2
to UCC §3-305 holds that "In most cases the holder in due course will
be an immediate or remote transferee of the payee.. ."). According to
93. This is a supplemental reason: it joins the argument that under U.C.C. § 3-111(c) there
was no "any other indication which does not purport to designate a specific payee." The court
adds that
There is no logical justification for creating a distinction between the designation of an
inanimate object... as the payee and the designation of a certain sum of money as the
payee. Judicially creating such a distinction would risk uncertainty for contracting par-
ties, thus thwarting the very intent of the adoption of the U.C.C.
Supra note 91, at 5 of the unpublished decision.
[Vol. 5:579
QUASI-CHECKS
the Colorado Court of Appeals, "[A] payee on an instrument... who
deals directly with the drawer or issuer is not typically entitled to as-
sert the rights of a holder in due course. ' 94 Contrariwise, pre-revision
UCC §3-302(2) specified that "a payee may be a holder in due
course." Although this clause was omitted from the revised UCC §3-
302, official comment 4 admits that "the payee ... can be a holder in
due course, but ... [this] is not the normal situation. '95 Granted; yet
the initial payee may be a holder in due course; and that should apply
to quasi-checks, as well. Of course, even if they might not count as
holders in due course themselves, initial payees have a clear interest in
negotiability precisely because the subsequent holders who take the
instrument for value will normally become holders in due course,
which directly effects the value of the negotiated instrument. 96 The
unavoidable conclusion is that even for initial payees, a negotiable in-
strument and a non-negotiable one are different entities of different
value. In this respect-although not in the sense of direct enforcement
of the instrument, where payees have an advantage-the reliance on
the negotiability of a quasi-instrument is shared by payees and subse-
quent holders alike.
IV. CONCLUSION
Quasi-instruments pose real problems of reliance in any system
characterized by a formalistic jurisprudence of construction. Dealing
with these problems requires breaking down the typical risks born by
the several parties involved in payment systems. While I argue that
the claims brought by the banking system in favor of treating some
quasi-instruments (i.e., quasi-checks) as fully negotiable ones are
weighty-irrespective of Check 21 which, if at all, made the inspection
of purported-checks easier rather than harder-I justify the doctrine
on the basis of the payee and subsequent holders' reliance on appar-
ent-instruments, while retaining payors' ability to create non-negotia-
ble instruments explicitly, limiting their in-rem application. I show that
94. Flatiron Linen, Inc. v. First Am. State Bank 1 P.3d 244 (Co. Ct. App. 1999). See also H.
BAILEY & R. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS §§ 9.4, 9.6. (rev. ed. 1998) (asserting that in
most cases, the holder in due course doctrine is irrelevant if defenses are being asserted against
the payee of instrument).
95. See also U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2 (admitting that "[I]n a small number of cases the payee of
the instrument may be a holder in due course.").
96. Payees may prefer to negotiate an instrument rather than present it for payment for an
array of real-world reasons: e.g., the presented instrument may be consumed by a payee's over-
draft, lien or other defenses that her bank may have against crediting her with the sum collected
by presentment; the payee may wish to keep the instrument out of the regular circulation of
bank-held funds, etc.; or the payee may fear dishonor of the instrument-a risk that a subse-
quent holder may be more willing to assume.
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some courts were sensitive to this concern while others were not, and
supply an alternative justification for an extension clause that extends
full negotiability to quasi-checks (namely, UCC §3-104(c)). The clause
expresses a functional, reliance-based, legal-realistic approach to ne-
gotiability at the expense of the strict formalism for which Article 3
jurisprudence has time and again been faulted. 97
This justification, however, seems to apply to quasi-instruments in
general, rather than privileging only quasi-checks. The 1990 revision,
by abolishing §3-805 has deepened the divide between checks and
other instruments. It justifiably struck down the awkward restriction
that there may be no holder in due course in quasi-instruments, but
also limited the scope of application of the provision to quasi-checks
only. This would be justified on a so-called "bank-based" interest due
to the banking system's special interest in checks and the costs of
processing them, discussed above. If, however (as I claim) a truer jus-
tification for the extension clause is the relational "payee/holder-
based" or "reliance-based" interest, than the distinction between
quasi-checks and the other several types of quasi-instruments is mis-
placed. The court in Waldron followed this logic implicitly.
I have also shown that there is a "bug" in the formulation of the
current UCC §3-104(c), and that the extension rule is in fact extended
as a matter of practice beyond its black-letter scope of application. It
would make good sense to codify this "extended extension" in the
next round of Article 3 revision and obliterate the formal and artificial
distinction between the two classes of quasi-instruments discussed
above-that lacking the language of negotiability and that lacking the
"pay" imperative.
The Oklahoma court in Walls required approaching negotiable in-
struments as "couriers without excess luggage,"98 employing a literate
rather than unequivocal policy. The dictum invokes the play Le voya-
geur sans bagage [Traveler without Luggage] by the French playwright
Jean Anouilh, whose protagonist is an amnesiac veteran of the Great
War who has completely lost his memory.99 When approaching such
texts as negotiable instruments, the formalistic principle of construc-
tion requires us to "forget," to an extent, the contextual and relational
history of its creation in favor of clear demarcation criteria of validity.
Nevertheless, equivocation persists because the court did not instruct
that the courier be considered as carrying no luggage at all. Determin-
ing what kinds of luggage and how much of it is "excessive" is not a
97. See supra note 7.
98. Supra note 17.
99. JEAN ANOUILH, LE VOYAGEUR SANS BAGAGE [Traveler without Luggage] (Paris, 1937).
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matter for legislative innovation but lays squarely in the domain of
application and adjudication. As shown above, a certain amount of
"luggage of relations" between the parties is carried even by the stin-
giest of couriers. Otherwise-while perhaps simpler to apply-this
provision would just be too arbitrary.
This essay is titled "an apology for a mutation." By this point in the
argument it should be clear that the term "apology" is used here in the
classic sense of an argumentative justification rather than the more
modern term of an act of contrition or an excuse. 00 And if we think of
quasi-checks as a "mutation" from the standard form of negotiable
instruments it is because quasi-checks originated not by fiat, as formal
law tends to proceed, but in and through practice, to contest a prevail-
ing formal structure and, in a small way, win it over. For mutation,
although prevalent mostly in the life sciences, is really a logical struc-
ture of change. Its essence consists of variation from established phe-
nomena that occur not by design but spontaneously, in real terms
rather than by construction. In the life sciences-mainly, biology-
mutations are studied, analyzed, classified, described and sometimes
technologically manipulated. In normative discourses such as law, mu-
tations that emerge through practice suggest themselves for our peru-
sal and critique. Determining whether-and for what justifying
reasons-we should support such mutations, has made up the bulk of
this apology.
100. The model, of course, is PLATO, THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES (1899) in which Socrates
both argues for his notion of the examined life as model for the good life (as well as involving
others in it through discourse) and justifies himself in front of the Athens court that eventually
condemned him.
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